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DRIVING mmn SUSPENSION - MOTOR. VEHICLE Ac:r PJWSECDTIONS 
Written by J. L. Sutherland, Cpl. 
(Victoria Police Department) 
Instructor, Traffic Studies 
As you are aware, the Supreme Court of Canada (Boggs vs. The Queen, Feb. 3, 
1981) ruled that Sec. 238(3) C.C. was ultra vires the Parliament of 
Canada. As a result, a period of time went by that no charges of Driving 
While Suspended were laid, simply because there was no charge available. 
The Provincial Government stepped in and the Motor Vehicle Act was amended 
and charges of suspended driving are now included in the Motor Vehicle Act 
(Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act No. 2, 1981) effective 07 July 1981. 
Reprinted here are the new applicable sections. Also, a new consideration, 
"industrial road" (reprinted from the Highway (Industrial) Act is 
included). 
"industrial road" means a road constructed or exist-
ing for transportation of natural resources, raw or 
manufactured, or transportation of machinery, materi-
als or personnel by motor vehicle, and includes all 
bridges, wharves, log dumps and works forming a part 
of it, but does not include a public road, street, 
lane or other public communication; a privately owned 
road used by a farmer or resident for his own pur-
poses; a road used exclusively for the construction 
and maintenance of electric power lines, telephone 
lines or pipe lines; roads and yards within manufac-
turing plants, industrial sites, storage yards, 
airports and construction sites; tote roads, cat 
roads and access roads;" 
88.1 "(l) For the purpose of this section, 'industrial 
road' means an industrial road as defined in the 
Highway (Industrial) Act. 
. 
(2) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway 
or industrial road knowing that his driver's licence 
or his right to apply for or obtain a driver's 
licence is suspended under section 25, 83, 87, 88, 
91, 94, or 214X commits an offence and is liable, 
(a) on a first conviction, to a fine of not 
less than $300 and not more than $2,000 
and to imprisonment for not less than 7 
days and not more than 6 months, and 
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(b) on a subsequent conviction, regardless 
of when the contravention occurred, to a 
fine of not less than $300 and not DX>re 
than $2,000 and to imprisonment for not 
less than 14 days and not unre than one 
year, 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), where a person is charged with 
committing an offence under subsection (2) and a court admits a 
certificate of the superintendent or deputy superintendent 
stating that the driver's licence of the defendant or the 
defendant's right to apply for or obtain a driver's licence was 
suspended on the date of the alleged offence, it shall be proof 
that the defendant had knowledge of the suspension at the time 
of the alleged offence unless he establishes on the balance of 
probabilities that he did not know of the suspension. 
(4) Where a person is charged with committing an offence under 
subsection (2) and the court finds that the defendant 
personally received a document containing notice of the 
suspension of his driver's licence or right to apply for or 
obtain a driver's licence before the time of the alleged 
offence under subsection (2), the defendant shall be 
conclusively deemed to have had knowledge of the suspension at 
the time of the alleged of fence." 
94.1 "(l) For the purpose of this section, "industrial road" means 
an industrial road as defined in the Highway (Industrial) Act. 
( 2) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or 
industrial road while his driver's licence or right to apply 
for or obtain a driver's licence is suspended under section 82 
or 92, commits an offence and is liable 
{a) on a first conviction, to a fine of not less 
than $300 and not more than $2,000 and to 
imprisonment for not less than 7 days and not 
more than 6 months, and 
(b) on a subsequent conviction, regardless of when 
the contravention occurred, to a fine of not 
less than $300 and not more than $2,000, and to 
imprisonment for not less than 14 days and not 
more than one year. 
(3) Subsection (2) creates an absolute liability offence in 
which guilt is established by proof of driving, whether or not 
the defendant knew of the suspension." 
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As you can see, it is still important for the police officer (crown) to 
ascertain the "EXACT• reason for the suspension. 
Sec. 88 .1 covers a driver who must have knowledge, as a prerequisite to 
conviction, that his licence was suspended for reasons of: 
1. Sec. 25 - (Fails to comply with or meet medical standards); 
2. Sec. 83 - (Various MVB Administration suspensions); 
3. Sec. 87 - (Failure to satisfy judgment against him); 
4. Sec. 88 - (Suspension by Superintendent); 
5. Sec. 91 - (Failure to pay certain fees); 
6. Sec. 94 - (Reciprocal agreement suspension); 
7. Sec. 214X - (24 hour drinking/driving suspension). 
If a person is suspended for any of the above reasons, then Sec. 88.1 is 
the appropriate section to charge. Sec. 88.1(3) and (4) set out how you 
can prove that a person knew of his suspension. 
There are, however, other reasons for which a person's driver s licence might 
be suspended. These include a conviction for: 
1. Sec. 88.1 - (Driving under suspension); 
2. Sec. 94.1 - (Driving under suspension); 
3. Sec. 233 c.c. - (Criminal Negligence in Operation of a 
Motor Vehicle, Hit & Run, Dangerous Driving); 
4. Sec. 234 c.c. - (Impaired Driving); 
5. Sec. 235 c.c. - (Refuse to give Breath Sample); 
6. Sec. 236 c.c. - (Drive over 80 mg. Alcohol); 
7. Sec. 203 c.c. - (Criminal Negligence Causing Death by use 
of a motor vehicle); 
8. Sec. 204 c.c. (Criminal Negligence causing bodily harm by 
use of a motor vehicle); 
9. Sec. 82 M.V.A. - (Court ordered suspensions). 
(Items #1 - 8 above are covered in Sec. 92 M.V.A.) 
Where any of the above are the "EXACT" reason for a driver's suspension, 
than Sec. 94.1 must be used to charge. 
You will notice that the penalty is the same for both charges but the 
method for proving "knowledge" is slightly different. (Compare Sec. 
88.1(3) and (4) with Sec. 94.1(3). 
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Effective December 11, 1981, police now have the capability of obtaining 
specific information on suspensions from the "PARIS" system. When an 
enquiry is made regarding a suspension, the P.C. will be given the 
following information: 
1. the start and end date of every suspension; 
2. the exact section number under which the person was suspended; 
3. a 'suggested' section number to charge the person. 
This information comes directly from the Motor Vehicle Branch records. It 
is the same information that can be obtained by means of a phone call. 
This now allows us the opportunity to get information at times when the 
Motor Vehicle Branch is closed. 
In the event of a "not guilty" plea, the Crown is still required to obtain 
a "certified extract" from the Motor Vehicle Branch for evidence. The CPIC 
message (at the present time) is not sufficient. 
Although this system is a great aid to police, it is not infallible. In 
cases where there is any conflicting information, contact the Motor Vehicle 
Branch by phone. The clerks in the office will then go directly to the 
handwritten file 1 which is still the 'most accurate'. 
ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS 
There are several amendments that you may not be aware of and are reprinted 
here to enable you to update your own Motor Vehicle Act. Sec. 61( 1) is 
amended to substitute "$400" in place of $200 as the amount as to when a 
motor vehicle incident must be reported. 
Sec. 92(1) is amended by adding "as it was before Sec. 57 of the 
Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 1981 came into force or under 
Sec. 88.l or 94.1 of this Act" after "subsection (9) of this section". 
Sec. 92(9) and (IO) is repealed. 
Sec. 94.2: 
"Where a person who is convicted of an offence under 
Sec. 88 .1 or 94. I has previously been convicted of an 
offence under either section, that prior conviction 
shall be conclusively deemed to be a first conviction 
for the purpose of determining the punishment to which 
the person is subject under Sec. 88.1 or 94.1." 
* * * * * 
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LIVING ON THE AVAILS OP' PROSTITUTION OP' AHOTllER. PERSON 
Jl. v. Murphy and Bieneck (1981) 60 c.c.c. (2d) 1 
A1berta Court of Appeal 
The evidence in this case revealed that the accused (Kevin Murphy) and the 
co-accused (Anne Bieneck) mutually agreed to live on the avails of Anne 
Bieneck's prostitution. 
The Crown's case was simple and straight forward. It was conceded that for 
Anne to be a prostitute or for her to live on the funds thereby earned is 
not an offence known to law. However, the Crown claimed that by allowing 
Kevin to share those earnings to avail himself in whole or in part of a 
living, Anne aided and abetted Kevin in committing the offence created by 
s. 195(l)(j) c.c. (living on the avails of prostitution). Section 21 c.c. 
provides that anyone who aids another person to commit an offence is a 
party to the offence and is punishable like the person who actually 
committed it. 
Furthermore the Crown claimed that the agreement between the two accused 
and their subsequent actions was sufficient to prove criminal conspiracy 
(s. 423 c.c.) 
The lower Courts had disagreed with the Crown's contentions and the issues 
came before the Alberta Court of Appeal. 
The defence position was that Anne was immune from the offence of living on 
the avails of her own prostitution and therefore could not be a party to 
the offence. This immunity also made it at law impossible for her to 
conspire to commit such an offence. Consequently, Murphy had conspired by 
himself, which is legally impossible. 
On the question whether Anne Bieneck could be convicted by means of section 
21 C.C. (aiding and abetting) the Court of Appeal held that: 
"Its operation must be confined to one who 
could, in law, have committed the offence 
charged." • • • • "It is senseless to invoke s. 
21 to make a party to a crime a person for whom 
no such crime exists in law". 
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On the question if Anne Bieneck could be convicted of conspiring with Murphy for 
him to live on the avails of her prostitution, the Court of Appeal ruled also on 
this in her favor: 
"It is urged on behalf of Bieneck that the crime of 
conspiracy should not be bent to catch the victim of 
the substantive offence. Notwithstanding that the 
victim willingly and knowingly entered into an 
agreement to attain the criminal objective by which 
she was victimized, as did Bieniek. A prostitute 
does not couanit an offence under the Criminal Code by 
earning her living from sexual commerce and 
Parliament has not sought to penalize her for doing 
so. That statutory immunity, it is said, ought not 
to be eroded by a side wind". 
On the question whether Murphy, on account of Bieneck's immunity, had not been 
capable in law to conspire with her to live on the avails of her prostitution, 
the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the Crown. It, in essence, held that the 
fact that one of the two parties to the agreement has an immunity does not have 
any bearing on the question whether a conspiracy exists. 
Comment: The finding that a person who cannot at law commit a certain offence 
cannot be a party to that offence, seems contrary to the intent of the law 
maker. For instance a woman cannot commit rape as the law defines this as an 
offence that can be committed by a male person only. However, women, by virtue 
of the provisions of section 21 C.C., have been convicted of that crime where it 
was shown that they aided and/or abetted the principal offender. One can hardly 
expect a woman who holds down the victim of a rape to accommodate the rapist to 
be immune from the offence of rape in those circumstances. Yet if one 
litterally applies the opinion of this Alberta Court to such a case, the 
accomplice would not commit any of fence safe conspiracy where there was proof of 
prior agreement and planning. 
It must be pointed out that in the hypothetical rape scene, the female offender 
is not the victim of the crime, while in· the "11 ving on the avails", she is. If 
this distinction caused the Alberta Court of Appeal to apply s. 21 of the 
Criminal Code the way they did, it is not clearly expressed in their reasons for 
judgement. 
The relationship between the two accused is not very clearly described in this 
judgement, and the evidence may have been sufficiently clear that the issue did 
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not have to be addressed. The issue is the one raised in the B. c. Court 
of Appeal in R. v. Celebrity Enterprises Ltd. [ 1978) 2 W.W.R. 562 and 
refers to the parasitical element that must exist in the arrangement 
between the prostitute and the person who lives on the avails. After all, 
she must be the victim. Prostitutes have necessaries of life like anyone 
else. They purchase groceries, gasoline, pay rent, etc. When the merchant 
or landlord is aware that the person is a prostitute, does he or she then 
live on the avails of her prostitution? The answer has been "No". It is 
only when one takes advantage of the occupation the person plies. For 
instance, demanding exhorbitant rent knowing that the prostitute has prob-
lems acquiring accommodation, would render the landlord liable. The typi-
cal protection which is sold to or forced onto the prostitute by the pimp, 
is clearly one of the legislation's targets. 
Assuming that in a marriage or living together arrangement both the man and 
the woman work and the woman voluntarily raises additional funds by prosti-
tuting herself so the rent and living expenses can be met, or the man can 
complete an education, it may, in B. C. at least, be viewed as not being a 
situation befitting the offence. The B. C. Court of Appeal held that 
"living on" connotes living j>arasitically. 
* * * * * 
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RES GESTAK STATEMENTS 
~ppenstein v. R. (1981) 3 V.V.R. 111 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
At 3:15 a.m., the accused and two others were found driving very slowly on 
the parking lot of a closed restaurant. Their pick-up truck (headlights 
doused) had come from behind a large garbage container where it was out of 
sight from the public road. "Jammed in" with them in the cab was a sledge-
hammer, a crow bar, four pair of gloves and three flashlights. 
They explained to have stopped to urinate. One said they had not had a 
chance to urinate, while the accused (Klippenstein) said they had urina-
ted. All were convicted of possessing instruments suitable for house or 
safe-breaking, in circumstances giving rise to the inference that they were 
intended to be used for that purpose. 
Klippenstein appealed his conviction and said that an inappropriate inf er-
ence of guilt was drawn from the inconsistency between his explanation of 
their presence and that of his co-accused. The trial judge had suggested 
that this inconsistency made him doubt that the explanation given was the 
truth. The conclusion, the accused claimed, could only have resulted from 
an error in the application of the law on the part of the Court. It is 
well established in common law that a person's statement is only evidence 
related to him and not his co-accused. Here the Judge had used the state-
ment of Klippenstein' s co-accused to conclude that his (Klippenstein' s) 
explanation of what they were doing on that parking lot was probably not 
true. 
The Court of Appeal reviewed what had happened during the trial. 
Klippenstein's counsel had insisted that the explanation by his client was 
admitted. He waived the right to a voir dire and said that the statement 
was part of res gestae (so closely connected with a fact that it is part of 
that fact). He urged that a failure to admit the explanation would be 
unfair. On that basis, and agreeing that the explanatory statement was 
part of res gestae, the statement was admitted. 
The Court of Appeal held that a voir dire must be held to consider the 
admissibility of a res gestae statement. However, the accused had expli-
citly waived his right to it. Furthermore a. res gestae statement is dis-
tinct from other statements and becomes evidence against or in favour of 
all accused. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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SWEARING OF AN DWORHATION 
Regina v. Pilcher and Broadberry [1981) 3 V.V.R.. 455 
Manitoba Provincial Court 
Hundreds of informations are routinely sworn every day to commence criminal 
proceedings. An informant has a choice to swear that he "says" or has 
"reasonable and probable grounds to believe and does believe" what is 
alleged in the information. The former requires first-hand and personal 
knowledge of what is alleged and the latter, the self-explanatory prere-
quisite grounds. 
In this case the informant was a police officer assigned to the Court. One 
of his functions was to swear informations. The defence called the officer 
to testify. He was found not to know anything of the case other than what 
was stated in the information. 
The Court stressed that the oath of an informant must be beyond reproach. 
Although it is impossible for such an officer to have knowledge of all 
facts (or even most of them), he must, nonetheless, be satisfied that there 
is some evidence to support the charge. This can be derived from reliable 
reports made up by others in the course of their investigation. 
The two accused were police officers accused of stealing firearms from the 
police department. A senior officer investigated the matter and discussed 
it with Crown Counsel who drafted the eleven count indictment. The senior 
officer and counsel simply handed the draft to the informant instructing 
him to have it typed and to swear to its content. 
Merely reading what appears in an information is inadequate to "protect an 
accused person from frivolous or foundationless accusations". The lack of 
the reasonable and probable grounds for the informant to believe that the 
accused committed the crimes alleged, renders the information a nullity and 
invalid. 
Information quashed. 
* * * * * 
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STOLER CKEDIT CARD 
1.. v. Coleman (1981] 3 w.w.1.. 572 
Alberta Queen's Bench 
Miss Coleman allegedly purchased clothing with a credit card which was 
stolen the previous day. As a consequence she was charged with unlawfully 
dealing with a credit card she knew was stolen (s. 301.l(e) C.C.) The 
Crown proved that she had possession of the card but failed to show that 
she used the card to make the purchase. This resulted in an acquittal. 
The Crown proceeded again, this time charging the accused with possession 
of the card. She entered a plea of autrefois acquit (double jeopardy). 
The Crown argued that the possession charge was an allegation of a separate 
and distinct offence (although it arose from the same circumstances). It 
maintained that the section 301.l(e) creates three offences, to wit: 
"possession of", "uses", and "deals in" a credit card one knows to be 
stolen (three verbs). 
However, the French version of the section creates one offence only, to 
wit: "dispose" which means, "have in one's possession or make use of" (one 
verb). Since both languages confer equal authenticity, and as the French 
version favored the accused, the Court held that section 301. l(e) creates 
one offence only. This means that the section in English or French simply 
describes different means to commit this one offence. 
In view of having been acquitted of this offence previously, the Court held 
that the accused was entitled to the plea of autrefois acquit. 
* * * * * 
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SOLICITING FOR THE PURPOSE OP PR.OSTITOTIOR 
PEllSISTDCE OR PRESSUKE 
The Queen v. Wbf.tter and The Queen v. Galjot 
Supreme Court of Canada. December I. 1981 (Rot yet reported) 
The circumstances in these two cases are identical. Ms. Whitter and Ms. 
Galjot were observed for a period of time and seen to approach several men 
on the streets of Vancouver. These periods ended by them being arrested 
after offering sexual services to an undercover police officer. The 
charges were soliciting a person in a public place for the purpose of 
prostitution. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in the well known Hutt* case, 
that an element of "persistence and pressure" is included in the word 
"solicit". In these Whitter and Galjot cases, the Crown argued that the 
"cumulative effect" of approaching all these men, amounted to being 
persistent and pressing. 
The Supreme Court of Canada observed that there was no evidence of what the 
conversation was · between these unknown men and the accused • In spite of 
the fact that the Court considered it naive to assume that the accused 
wished to discuss "politics or other matters of social concern" the 
witnesses' approaches offered the Crown no assistance. 
The Supreme Court held that each approach by the accused was an independent 
act. Thus, even if the Crown could show that each time the accused offered 
a sexual service for pay, it would not assist in proving "persistence or 
pressure". Said the Court: 
"At the most, the Crown 
respondents may have been 
energetically ..... 
has shown that the 
plying their trade 
In addition, the charges alleged in the words of the section that the 
accused solicited "a person". That person in both cases was the undercover 
officer and the evidence in either of them did not reveal that any 
persistence or pressure was applied. 
Crown's Appeals Dismissed 
Acquittals Upheld 
Note: When these cases were decided by the B. C. Court of Appeal (which 
* R. v. Hutt (1978] 2 s.c.R. 476, (1978] 2 w.w.R. 247. 
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had come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court of Canada) there was 
one dissenting judgement. This Justice reasoned that the succession of 
approaches by the accused connected to one another by time and place, 
caused them to be one act of soliciting. Be also expressed the view that 
it was Parliament's intent "to abate the social nuisance and inconvenience 
caused by the practice of soliciting for prostitution in public". 
The Supreme Court of Canada considered this opinion, but concluded that the 
enactment gives no effect to such an intention. It said that if any change 
was desirable then "legislative action would be necessary". 
In other words: "Don't come here again for a remedy for your social 
problems. As long as the law is worded the way it is now, we will give you 
the same answer as before. Persuade Parliament that you have a problem and 
ask them for an amendment to these laws". 
* * * * * 
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IS A PRIVATE CAR A PUBLIC PLACE? 
Jl.. v. Figliuzzi [1981] 4 W.W.R. 595 
Alberta Queen's Bench 
In 1978 in the now famous Hutt* case, the Supreme Court of Canada 
"volunteered" their opinion on whether a private car on a public street is 
a public place. Ms. Hutt had entered the car of an undercover agent and 
had, while inside the car, offered sexual services for remuneration. The 
issue placed before the Supreme Court of Canada was the definition of 
soliciting. However, the Court offered an opinion on whether or not the 
alleged soliciting occurred in a public place. Said our highest Court: 
"I am most strongly of the opinion that this officer's 
automobile was not such a public place but was, on the 
other hand, a private place of which he had the sole 
control". 
In this case, the accused Figliuzzi was charged with committing an indecent 
act in a public place (s. 169(a) C.C.). The entire act took place in the 
accused's car on a public street in view of at least one person who was 
using the street. The accused raised the argument that in view of the Hutt 
decision his car was a private place. 
The Alberta Queen's Bench Justice was of the opinion that there was quite a 
distinction between the Hutt case and this case. In the soliciting 
incident, only words were exchanged. Visually, nothing offensive to the 
public occurred. The opinion given by the Supreme Court of Canada is 
limited to the facts of the Hutt case and not a precedent to say that the 
interior of a private car is not a public place irrespective of the 
circumstances. The Justice suggested that the Supreme Court of Canada's 
definition does not apply to offences like indecent acts, nudity, etc., 
where the act is observed by another person in a public place. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Hutt [1978) 2 s.c.R. 476, [1978) 2 w.w.R. 247. 
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PJWTECTIOB OF PRIVACY 
Begina v. llonachen (1981) 60 c.c.c. (2d) 286 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused had phoned the police station on two occasions and threatened 
to kill a certain police officer. All calls on the switchboard are taped 
and the recording was adduced in evidence to prove the accused "knowingly 
uttered a threat to cause death". 
The accused argued that the communication was a private one as it was not 
reasonable to expect that a call to the police station will be intercepted 
(which includes to record). 
The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that: 
"It was not reasonable to expect that the communica-
tions in question which threatened a police officer 
would not be listened to or recorded by any person 
other than the switchboard operator". 
Since the communication was not private, the evidence of it was admissible 
without a transcript having been served on the accused in compliance with 
s. 178.16(4) c.c. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Accused ordered to stand trial again. 
Comment: What appears unique about this decision is that it was not con-
sidered reasonable for the originator of the communication to suspect that 
his communication would not be intercepted because he telephoned a police 
switchboard, but rather because of the gravity of its content. The Court 
actually said that since the accused phoned the police which is tasked with 
law enforcement, it was reasonable for him to expect that they, because of 
that mandate, would tape the communication. 
If one carries this reasoning through, then, because of its duty and obli-
gation, any person communicating messages related to crime ought to expect 
that police will intercept his communications if they are on to him. It 
seems not likely that this case can be seen as a precedent for such an 
interpretation of the "Invasion of Privacy" enactments, yet that premise is 
implied. 
It would have been very useful if the Court had reasoned that, due to the 
emergency situations frequently reported to police on their switchboard and 
playback capability being so important to determine details necessary to 
respond, it ought to be reasonable for anyone to expect that calls to such 
a switchboard are recorded. In my view, that is not what the Court said. 
* * * * * 
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HIT & 1WN 
R.. v. Roche (unreported) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, November 20, 1981, CA. 810305 
The accused backed into another car; he stopped, had a conversation with 
the occupants of the other vehicle and drove off without identifying 
himself. There were no injuries. 
The accused was convicted of hit and run (failing to give his name and 
address) under the Criminal Code. On appeal, the County Court ordered a 
new trial on a simple point of law. Section 233(3) C.C. in essence states 
that it may be presumed that a person intends to escape civil and criminal 
liability, when involved in an accident, he fails 
I. to stop; 
2. to give his name and address; and 
3. to offer assistance where anyone is injured. 
This suggests that when a person is involved in an accident in which no one 
is injured, he must both fail to stop and fail to give his name and address 
before it may be presumed that he had the intent to escape civil and 
criminal liability. The trial judge had considered that the intent was 
proved by the failure to give name and address only. This, in view of the 
above, the County Court Judge considered an error and that is why the new 
trial was ordered. 
The Crown took this issue to the B. C. Court of Appeal and simply asked if 
the County Court Judge's opinion was the proper interpretation of s. 233(3) 
c.c. This Court reiterated that where an intent to escape civil and 
criminal liability is proved, any one of the failures (stopping, 
identifying oneself and offering assistance) is sufficient to find guilt of 
the offence created by s. 233(2) C.C. In 19721 this B. c. Court of Appeal 
said and in this case confirmed that: 
"The statutory duty is both to stop and give name and 
address and in addition, where any person is injured, 
to offer assistance". 
Nevertheless, two of the three justices of the Court of Appeal agreed with 
the County Court Judge that to rely on the presumption of intent in 233(31) 
C.C. compliance with anyone of the duties negates the presumption. 
1[1972) 4 W.W.R. 129 R. v. Sture 
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The Court reasoned that subsections (2) and (3) of section 233 C.C. serve 
entirely different purposes and that the only similarity between them is 
the wording. The former creates the offence of · hit and run and the latter 
provides the presumption of the intent prerequisite to conviction. 
About the apparent inconsistency to give different interpretations to 
similar worded enactments the Court said: 
"This prima f acie inconsistency disappears, however, 
in my opinion, on a comparison of the syntaxl of two 
subsections. I think the · correct meaning of 
subsection (2) is that Parliament intended an accused 
should be guilty of an offence unless all of the 
described statutory duties be performed, provided, of 
course, intent to escape liability is proved. On the 
other hand, I find no absurd, unintelligible or 
meaningless result when the word 'and' in subsection 
(3) is read conjunctively as prima facie it should be 
in accord with its usual normal meaning". 
This means that the duties imposed by law on a driver involved in an 
accident are alternative to find guilt of hit and run, but conjunctive when 
we want to presume the intent to escape on account of failure to meet these 
duties. 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Order for new trial upheld. 
Note: The presumption of intent in subsection (3) of section 233 C.C. is 
not exhaustive. This means that the intent to escape can be proved by 
means other than this statutory presumption. 
It is of interest that the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dealt with the very 
same question in R. v. Adler2. This Court held that intent to escape civil 
and criminal liability may be presumed where a person fails to do any one 
of the things mentioned in section 233(3) C.C. 
lThe way in which words are put together to form phrases, clauses or 
sentences. 
2(1981) 59 c.c.c. (2d) 517. 
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Adler had been acquitted in Provincial Court of hit & run. He had collided 
with a car containing two occupants. Both were slightly injured. The 
accused stopped and remained at the scene. He did not come out of his 
pick-up truck and the injured parties were cared for by witnesses of the 
accident who also checked with the accused for injuries. Adler supplied, 
on request, some material to take care of the injured. The accused, who, 
no doubt, was under the influence of liquor, finally came out of his truck, 
leaned on the car he collided with and after saying "What do you figure"? 
walked home leaving his truck where it was. 
In spite of finding in favor of the Crown on the interpretation of s. 
233(3) c.c., the majority of the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the 
acquittal holding that there was in the words of section 233(3) C.C., 
"evidence to the contrary". This simply because: 
". • in leaving the scene of the accident, the 
appellant did not have the intent to escape civil and 
criminal liability". 
It is not easy to pin down; but something does not seem legally "kosher" 
with the reasoning adopted here. 
Assuming that section 233(3) C.C. had not been enacted, would drunkenness 
then have been capable of being a defence to hit & run? Only if the 
offence is one of "specific intent" as opposed to "general intent". This 
Court did not decide on that issue and simply held that the accused's 
inebriation was "evidence to the contrary" to presume that he left the 
scene and failed to identify himself and render assistance to the injured 
to escape civil and criminal liability. 
Statutory presumptions do not shift the burden of proof on the accused in 
spite of what they appear to say, but seem to have been created to assist 
the Crown in meeting its burden to prove all elements of an offence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In this case it appears to have done the opposite. If 
the offence of hit & run is one of general intent, drunkenness would not be 
a defence, but due to the presumption in s. 233(3) C.C. by the reasoning of 
this Court, it would be "evidence to the contrary" preventing intent from 
being presumed. If the views of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal are 
correct, then considering that in the real world a very large percentage of 
the drivers that "run" when involved in an accident, do so because of 
inebriation, s. 233(3) C.C. is a presumption the Crown can do without. 
* * * * * 
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REFUSDIG ro GIVE A SAMPLE OF BUATll 
JlIGBT ro COUBSKL 
R. vs. Eddy (unreported) 
County Court of Westminster, October 21, 81 adllivack llegistry c.c. Ro. 
214/81 
The accused was encountered on the highway driving his car. He was weaving 
and displaying all symptoms of impairment. A proper demand was ma.de of him 
and when the accused arrived at the breathalyzer he refused to give the 
sample until he had spoken to a lawyer. 
He was given the use of a phone and privacy and in a matter of 25 minutes 
managed to place six calls, two to Vancouver (approximately 90 km. away) 
and four to local lawyers. The accused, according to his own testimony, 
requested advice from the police officers about the local lawyers, 
particularly which one they recommended he call. Needless to say, he was 
shown the list of lawyers in the phone book and no such recommendation was 
made. 
At the conclusion of the 25 minutes the officers ma.de a demand and informed 
the accused that failure to give a sample at this time would result in 
charges. As the accused refused to give a sample of breath until he had 
spoken to a lawyer, a charge of refusing was preferred and the accused was 
convicted. The Provincial Court Judge ruled at the conclusion of a trial 
that considering all the circumstances "every reasonable step was taken on 
this occasion to put you in touch with counsel". This meant that his 
failure to contact counsel could not serve as a "reasonable excuse" to 
refuse to give a breath sample, and the accused was convicted. 
The accused appealed the conviction to this County Court, claiming that 
when the final demand was made of him to give a sample of his breath, he 
was still in the process of seeking legal advice. The "improper haste" of 
the officers prevented him from receiving counsel. His argument that the 
"now or never' demand was improper was based on the fact that therr was 
ample time left before the two-hour time period from the time of driving 
lapsed and that he was not stalling or procrastinating. 
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The accused, of course, relied heavily on the Supreme Court of Canada 
judgement in the well known Brownridge easel, the relevant portion of which 
states: 
". • • unless it is apparent that the accused person 
is not asserting his right to counsel bona fide, but 
is asserting such right for the purpose of delay or 
for some other improper reason, the denial of that 
right affords a 'reasonable excuse' for failing to 
provide a sample of his breath as required by the 
section". 
This County Court Judge found, as many of his colleagues have, that there 
simply is "no definitive answer to what constitutes a reasonable length of 
time to contact counsel". However, with considerable sympathy to busy 
police officers who cannot afford to spend inordinate amounts of time 
waiting for a suspected impaired driver to contact counsel, the Court found 
in favor of the accused. 
The Court said: 
"When a person is in custody and that person is 
facing possible criminal charges he is clearly 
entitled to contact counsel of his choice • • • The 
police investigation was not being thwarted in any 
manner by the appellant in further attempts to 
contact counsel. It follows therefore, that the 
police officers did not act reasonably in insisting 
upon the appellant taking a breath test at the time 
that they did while the appellant was still 
attempting to contact a lawyer". 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Acquittal directed 
Comment: To the best of my knowledge, Brownridge was arrested for impaired 
driving and then the demand for a breath sample was made. The judgment was 
based on the interpretation of section 2( c)(ii) of the Bill of Rights, 
which stipulates that no law in Canada shall be construed or applied so as 
to deprive a person who has been arrested or detained of the right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay. The cases decided on the 
Brownridge precedent appear to be a mixture of situations where some 
lsrownridge v. The Queen (1972) 7 c.c.c. (2d) 417 (s.c.c.) 
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suspected impaired drivers were arrested while others simply were demanded 
to accompany the officer and supply samples of breath for analyses. 
It seems clear from judicial opinions that a person who is obligated to 
accompany is not under arrest or in custody. The of fence of refusing is 
complete when he does refuse, wherever that is. The question then remains 
if a suspect "under demand" is detained. This very question was posed in 
the Supreme Court of Canada 1 in relation to the roadside test. The Court 
did not say that in this regard the roadside demand is distinct from the 
demand to accompany, but held that citizens are by statute and common law 
in many situations compelled to obey and follow the directions of 
authorities and that when complying with such direction does not mean that 
the person is detained. 
If this argument was raised in a case like this one, where the accused was 
seemingly not under arrest, one wonders if the Court could hold that it is 
distinct from the Brownridge case. 
* * * * * 
1 Chromiak v. The Queen 49 c.c.c. (2d) 257 
(A synopsis of that case may be found on page 3 of the first issue of 
this publication). 
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TRAFFIC VIOLATION UPOltTS 
It. and Van Mulligan (Hot :reported) 
County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver Registry OC810496 
According to the 1979 amendment to section 121 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 
only those who produce a B. c. driver's licence only be served with a 
T. V .R., and will be subject to the procedures described in the Motor 
Vehicle Act. 
Mr. Van Mulligan was served a T.V.R. for driving without due care and 
attention when he rear ended a car that was stopped to turn left as soon as 
the oncoming traffic cleared. The T.V.R. was entered as an exh!bit at the 
hearing to determine if the violation took place. The officer who issued 
and served the T.V.R. did not testify, but the details of the accident were 
given by the driver of the car that was struck by Van Mulligan. 
The Justice of the Peace found that Van Mulligan did drive without due care 
and attention and an appeal was launched. 
Mr. Van Mulligan argued that it was not proved that he produced a B. C. 
driver's licence. He said that the number on the exhibit (T.V.R.) was 
inadequate to infer that he had produced a B. C. Licence, and that, 
therefore, the Justice of the Peace, should not have assumed jurisdiction. 
The County Court Judge held that proof that the alleged violator produced a 
B. C. driver's licence is "the starting point to founding jurisdiction for 
a T.V.R. hearing". 
Holding that filing the T.V.R. as an exhibit with a B. C. driver's licence 
number displayed on it, was unable "to fill the gap created by failing to 
call the officer to prove this fact" (that Van Mulligan produced a B. c. 
driver's licence). Said the Court: 
"In my opinion that omission of the Crown to produce 
affirmative evidence of the demand for and production 
of a valid driver's licence creates a flaw in its 
case, the failure to establish jurisdiction in the 
traffic court to embark on a T .v .R. hearing". 
* * * * * 
Appeal allowed 
Finding that violation was 
committed was set aside. 
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JUDICIAL ROTICE OP RESULTS OF CONSUMPTIOli OF ALCOHOL 
K.. v. Trithardt (unreported) 
County Court of Westminster. July 28 1981 
The accused drove into a parked car. According to an experienced police 
officer attending at the scene, the accused was simply "drunk". He was 
convicted of iDIPaired driving. There was apparently evidence that the 
accused was under the influence of half a bottle of whiskey. 
The trial judge held that in today's society it was common knowledge what 
effect the consumption of alcohol has on a person. This knowledge, coupled 
with the large quantity of liquor consumed by the accused, permitted him to 
take judicial notice of the fact that such is ••obviously more liquor than a 
person should consume if he is going to be working with any kind of 
machinery or operating any kind of vehicle". 
The trial judge agreed that he could not take judicial notice in regards to 
the blood-alcohol content such consumption would result in, but could in 
regards to the condition of a person who drinks some 13.5 oz. of whiskey. 
The accused appealed his conviction arguing that the trial judge could not 
take judicial notice as he did and should have made his conclusions on 
expert evidence on the issue. 
The Crown raised an interesting argument to show that there was a precedent 
for the Judiciary to take such notice. An accused 1 who had taken "a good 
drink of vodka" after he drove, had claimed that this was evidence to the 
contrary to presume that his blood alcohol content at the time of analysis 
was the same as at the time of driving. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal agreed with that accused saying: 
". • • if the taking of that drink could have 
any effect whatever on the proportion of alco-
hol to blood, 1t must surely be to increase 
the proportion of alcohol in the blood after 
the time of the alleged offence and before the 
test". 
This, submitted crown counsel, was a judicial notice of the effects of 
alcohol consumption on a person. 
As in this case there was no indication what the effect of alcohol intake 
would be. The County Court held that the issue here was distinct from that 
in the Kazanl case. 
* * * * * 
1 R. v. Kazan Court of Appeal CA 80091 
Appeal Allowed 
Verdict Set Aside 
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IMPAiltED DK.IVIBG ARD FAILIHG TO GIVE SAMPLE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMERT DENYING DRIVING ON CR.OSS EXAHIIIATION 
I. v. Milne (Unreported) 
Co1Dlty Caurt of Prince Rupert, September 4, 1981 
The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to comply with a 
demand for a breath sample. 
The accused and another occupant of the car testified that not the accused 
but the other occupant drove the car at the time. 
As a consequence, the trial judge had a reasonable doubt if the accused was 
the driver and acquitted him. However, he held that the officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the accused had committed 
the offence of impaired driving and therefore the demand was justifiable. 
This meant that the accused had no excuse to refuse giving a sample and he 
was convicted. The accused appealed. 
The accused had, prior to the demand and after, denied driving. This, of 
course, was very important to determine if the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds. The trial judge had, however, blocked this from being 
adduced in evidence. 
Defence counsel was refused to bring out in cross examination the evidence 
of what the accused said to the officer before the arrest was effected. 
This, held the trial judge, would have adduced a self serving statement 
which had not been led by the Crownl. Although this is the law, there are 
exceptions to that rule. One is the statement a person makes at the time 
of arrest. It was simply important for the Court to know what was said 
between the accused and the officer when the accused was confronted with 
accusations. To deprive the defence from bringing this conversation out if 
the Crown does not, particularly in a case where it may determine if the 
officer had the requisite grounds to make the demand, is an error in law. 
Conviction quashed 
New trial ordered 
Note: In the Graham case the accused was found to be in possesion of 
stolen jewelry. When asked at the scene about the goods, he said he had 
never seen them before. After a couple of hours in cells, he asked to 
speak to the detectives and gave them a statement the content of which 
1 See R. v. Graham (1972) 7 c.c.c. (2d) 93 
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would make the accused's possession an innocent one. Crown counsel 
selected not to put this statement in evidence but defence counsel attemp-
ted to extract the statement when cross examining the detectives. Whether 
or not he could do so, or if the Crown was obliged to put the explanatory 
statement in evidence, ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada. This, 
particularly so, as the Crown relied on the doctrine of recent possession 
to prove that Graham knew that the goods he had in his possession were 
obtained by the commission of an indictable offence. An accurate descrip-
tion of the doctrine is that it is a common law presumption that someone 
who is in unexplained possession of goods recently stolen, did steal them 
or has knowledge that they were so obtained. In other words, when you are 
in possession of such goods, you either explain or may stand condemned. 
Graham did explain and he argued therefore that either the Crown was 
obliged to adduce the evidence of his explanatory statement or he should 
have been able to introduce it through cross examination of the detec-
t! ves. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with the accused and held 
that this would only be so if the statement was given contemporaneously to 
being found in possession. In the alternative, the accused could testify 
and give his explanation to the Court. The statement Graham made after two 
hours was self serving and given after time to possibly concoct an exculpa-
tory explanation that then would be introduced in evidence by a person 
(detective in this case) who could only be cross examined on the fact that 
the statement was made rather than on the truth of its content. 
This means that the Crown was only obligated to give the contemporaneous 
statement in which he claimed he never saw the goods before, but not his 
detailed statement a couple of hours later. 
The exception to the general rule of evidence then is that a voluntary 
statement of an accused when first taxed with incriminating facts is 
vitally relevant to his reaction and ultimately to his guilt or innocence. 
Another one of these exceptions is where a witness identifies an accused in 
Court and has made a previous identification of that person. The evidence 
surrounding that previous identification is subject to the same exception. 
* * * * * 
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CREDIT CARD 
R. v. Costello (Unreported) 
County Court of Vancouver (Ro. <X:801422 .June 5 1981) 
Costello found a credit card which he simply placed on a shelf in his 
kitchen. When he ran short of funds while entertaining friends, the 
accused went home and picked up the card and used it to pay for his 
expenses for the rest of the evening. Hotel security officers apprehended 
the accused, who, when defending himself on a charge that he used a credit 
card he knew was obtained by means of an indictable offence, claimed that 
he had obtained the card innocently. 
This Court agreed, but held that "obtaining" is not restricted to getting 
or gaining possession of something. When it comes to the criminal intent 
it includes what a person does with it. This, the Court said, was 
supported by the content of section 283(4) C.C. which stipulates that to 
prove theft, it is not important if something was not taken for the purpose 
of conversion or if it was in the lawful possession of a person when he 
converted it. The Court said that when the accused used the innocently 
obtained credit card he then obtained it by theft. "On the formation of 
this intent he crossed the threshold from innocent obtaining, to theft. 
The accused's conviction was upheld. 
Comment: In view of my comments on page 22 of our Volume No. 3, the 
findings of this Court are interesting. They seem mre in line with the 
apparent intent of Parliament than the views expressed in R. v. Martin. 
* * * * * 
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PK.OCEDUKE BY VAY OF INFOKMATIOB AGAINST OWHER OF MOTOR. VEHICLE 
THE DRIVElt OF WHICH ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED A TRAFFIC RULE 
Regina v. Levae (Unreported) Fort St • .John Registry Ro. CX:ll/81 
County Court of Cariboo September 21, 1981 
The accused was charged under the provisions of section 7 6 of the B. C. 
Motor Vehicle Act that he was the owner of a car, the driver of which 
failed to yield the right-of-way. In spite of the fact that this is a 
violation of a traffic rule the Crown proceeded by means of an information 
and a sununons in accordance with the provisions of the B. C. Offence Act. 
At the commencement of trial the Judge held that the information was a 
nullity as the Crown should have proceeded via a Traffic Violation Report. 
Upon appeal, the County Court, in essence, reasoned that the liability of 
the owner of a car with which a violation of the Motor Vehicle Act (and 
some other Acts and By-laws) is committed, is created by section 76 of the 
Act, which is in Part I. 
The prohibition to proceed by information in the case of a traffic rule 
violation is in section 122 and refers to procedures prescribed in that 
section and those following, up to and including section 129. These 
sections are in Part III of the Act. It is well established in law that 
nothing is an of fence unless the law specifically says it is. When a 
charge for an offence is preferred the person is charged under the penalty 
section, the section that creates the liability. Therefore, a person 
charged as the owner of a motor vehicle is charged under section 76 M.V.A. 
Except as specifically provided in section 127 M.V.A., the Offence Act and 
the procedures prescribed therein apply to all offences. This includes 
offences under section 76. Therefore, the Crown was obliged to proceed by 
way of information rather than by Traffic Violation Report. 
Crown's Appeal Allowed 
* * * * * 
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ASSAULT - DEFDCE OF NECESSITY 
PREVDTDJG Vll'E FROM ALIGBTIRG VBILE DllVDJG ALORG AT 60 K.P.B. 
JL. •· Morris 61 c.c.c. (2d) 163 
Alberta Court of the Queen's Bench 
The accused drove his intoxicated wife home at 1 :00 a.m. While they were 
going along the highway the wife demanded to be returned to town. She 
wanted to tell police how displeased she was with the way they treated 
"Lillian". Lillian, who was prohibited for life from attending the tavern 
where Mrs. Morris managed to get in her drunken condition, had showed up 
anyway and every table she (Lillian) joined was cut off from service. This 
had resulted in protest by Mrs. Morris, police attendance and Lillian's 
removal. 
To prevent his wife from stepping out of the truck while driving 60 M.P.H. 
and grabbing the steering wheel to make the necessary U-turn to return to 
town, the accused had put his spouse of 19 years and the DK>ther of his five 
children in a headlock while driving the remaining miles home. This 
resulted in a charge of common assault. 
The Court disbelieved the wife when she claimed she had been beaten several 
times while being driven home. It found that, allowing his wife to alight 
or walk back in the dark in her condition would have amounted to criminal 
negligence on the part of the accused had anything happened to her. 
Furthermore, she was his spouse and he was under a legal duty to provide 
the necessaries of life to her (s. 197 c.c.). Seeing her safely home in 
these circumstances "could" be a necessary of life said the Court. 
Finally the Court explored the possible application of section 199 C.C. 
which stipulates: 
Said the Court: 
"Everyone who undertakes to do an act is under 
a legal duty to do it if an omission to do the 
act is or may be dangerous to life". 
"To have allowed his wife to get out of the 
vehicle in her intoxicated condition could 
have endangered her life in contravention of 
the section". 
In the emergency situation the accused found himself in, he could not 
assess the "nicety" of his legal position. He had to act and he did in 
good faith. 
Accused Acquittal was Upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CAB A FEARFUL SUSPKCl GIVE A VOLUBTAll.Y STATEMERT? 
a. v. Griffen (1981) 59 c.c.c. (2d) 506 
Ontario High Court of Justice 
The accused, charged with murdering his wife, gave four separate statements 
to police which the Crown sought to have admitted in evidence. 
On the voir dire the accused did not claim that he was treated wrongly by 
police in any way. He testified that there had been no threats, promises 
or any improper, unreasonable or oppress! ve conduct on the part of the 
officers. 
However, the accused claimed that he had wanted to be left alone, and had 
given the statements after he had been informed that his wife had succumbed 
to the wounds he inflicted on her. He claimed that from then on he feared 
that the officers would beat him to get information. 
The defence argued that a statement given in these circumstances is as 
unsafe to rely on as a statement extracted by wrongdoing on the part of 
police. Voluntariness, it was submitted, must receive a subjective test, 
as it is the state of mind of the accused that determines it, and not 
simply the actions of others that may have affected it. In other words, 
the fear, regardless of its cause, renders the content of the statement 
unreliable. 
The question the Court had to answer therefore, was whether the existence 
of the accused's fear rendered these statements inadmissible in evidence, 
in spite of the fact that the fear was not caused by anything the police 
officers did. 
The Justice of this Court observed that the Canadian Judiciary seem divided 
on the issue. He suspected that Judges who view the rules of evidence 
regarding admissibility of statements to be "primarily" to prevent 
unreliable evidence from being admitted, would agree with the submissions 
made by the defence in this case. However, judges who view these rules 
primarily to "protect the integrity of the criminal justice system" would 
reject the defence arguments. The latter opinion is, no doubt, predominant 
in the Commonwealth, and has as a consequence that a statement will not be 
excluded unless there is wrongdoing on the part of the persons in 
authority. 
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After considerable legal soul searching the Court held that where a state-
ment is made out of fear, that fear must be the result of acts on the part 
of the authorities. 
The first statement the accused made was at the scene shortly after the 
murder took place. There was no problem with this statement and it was 
ruled admissible in evidence. 
After eight hours of custody without being spoken to, the accused was 
questioned and made the other statements. 
The Court found that the accused did fear that police would beat him if he 
gave no information. The hours of custody without being given any informa-
tion had added to that fear the Court held. For that, police were respon-
sible and therefore the statements, other than the one given at the scene, 
were in~dmissible. 
Comment: There was a lot more to the reasons for judgment than what shows 
in this synopsis. In his legal soul searching the Justice of the High 
Court of Justice seemed to remind himself that inconsistency in law results 
in injustice. Although the issues in the case are distinct from those in 
this Griffen case, the Justice seemed bothered by rossibly being inconsis-
tent with the precedent established in the Rothman case. The major issue 
in that case was whether an undercover agent (who, needless to say, lied to 
the accused about who and what he was) is a person in authority even when 
the accused did not know when he made the statement to that agent, that he 
was a person and can effect the path of prosecution. The Supreme Court sat 
with a "full house", meaning that all nine Justices gave their opinions on 
the issue. Six of them agreed with each other and rendered a majority 
judgment, which, for the time being at least, is the law in Canada. These 
six Justices reiterated that whether or not a person is a person in author-
ity in respect to the admissibility of a statement made to him or her 
depends on what the accused, at the time he made the statement, believed 
that person to be. Rothman believed the officer to be a fellow prisoner, 
who is hardly a person in authority. In other words, to determine the 
status of the person who received the statement, a subjective rather than 
an objective test must be applied. (As it may be interesting to understand 
the various judicial views of this issue, the dissenting reasons for judg-
ment are explained below). 
The Justice in this Griffen case (in view of the Rothman decision) consi-
dered if the belief of the accused determines whether or not the person to 
whom he made a statement is a person in authority, perhaps the same test 
!Rothman v. The Queen (1981) 59 c.c.c. (2d) 30 S.C.C. 
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ought to be applied to determine voluntariness. In other words, if his 
fears were real (although not caused by anything the person(s) in authority 
did) the statement should not be allowed. With some apparent reluctance, 
this Justice rejected that reasoning seemingly for practical rather than 
for philosophical reasons. 
Synopses of Dissenting Reasons for Judgment: 
One Justice who gave a separate reason for judgment agreed with his six 
brothers in regards to the subjective test. He further suggested that 
statements made to a person in authority should not be admitted in evidence 
if an inducement by that person may render the statement untrue (note it 
must be the inducement that may make the content of the statement untrue 
and not a voluntary lie on the part of the accused) and/or if a person in 
authority, whether or not the accused knew he was such a person, has used 
such "shocking" methods to extract the statement that the Judiciary should 
disassociate themselves from such conduct to preserve the reputation of the 
justice system. 
The two remaining Justices, dissenting, held that the statement should not 
be admissible in evidence by the application of an exclusionary rule. They 
observed that the accused had told police he wished to remain silent. He 
was then placed in cells with a person in authority, regardless of whether 
or not he knew who or what his cellmate was. In other words, the justice 
system employed tactics which amounted to tricks and lies, with the 
specific purpose "to subvert the accused's expressed decision to remain 
silent". These methods bring the system into such disrepute that the 
statement ought not to be admitted in evidence. 
* * * * * 
- 31 -
Legal Tidbits 
Milne v. '1'be Queen (unreported) (1981) County Court of Westainster Ho. 
XB0-5253. 
The accused was involved in an accident at approximately 2: 45 and he 
arrived at the police station at 2:58 for the purpose of analyzing samples 
of his breath. At 3:04 he requested to phone counsel and made contact with 
him at 3:22 for a 15 minute conversation. By this time the breathalyzer 
was in use and unavailable. As a consequence, the samples were taken at 
4:11 and 4:28. 
The accused claimed that the readings obtained were not proof of his 
blood-alcohol content at the time of driving as the samples were not taken 
"as soon as practicable" {section 237(l)(e)(ii) C.C. ). 
The County Court Judge applied the precedent set by the B. c. Court of 
Appeal in R. v. Carter 55 C.C.C. {2d) 405 which established that ··as soon 
as practicable" means "as soon as feasible" and not "as soon as possible". 
The delays were reasonable and justified. 
* * * * * 
Joynt v. 'l'he Queen (unreported) (1981) County Court of Westminster Ho. 
X80-5499 
The accused, convicted of over ".08%" appealed, claiming that the constable 
who operated the breathalyzer was not a "qualified technician". The 
designation by Attorney General of B. C. was put in the record but no 
evidence was adduced that the designation was published in the B. C. 
Gazette. 
In many provinces these designations are gazetted, but in Ontario, 
Saskatchewan and British Columbia, they are not. Whether or not gazetting 
is required to validate the designation is not clear, although many Courts 
have held that gazetting is not essential. The B. C. Courts, including the 
Court of Appeal, have held that the fact of designation and not gazetting 
is essential. 
Accused's appeal was dismissed 
* * * * * 
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Good Try! 
lie Dozois and The Queen 61 c.c.c. (2d) 171 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
Dozois, when still having to serve 738 days of a 10 1/2 year sentence for 
various crimes including manslaughter, was gven a pass to attend a 
funeral. He failed to return and while unlawfully at large he committed 
crimes in California and was sentenced in California to serve a period of 3 
years and 8 months. A year and a half later he was returned to Canada 
under the provisions of the Transfer of Offenders Act. 
Dozois claimed that the time he served in the California gaol should count 
against the unserved portion of the sentence in Canada. The Court of 
Appeal rejected Dozois' views and held that the sentence handed down by the 
California Court must, for the purpose of release, mandatory supervision, 
parole or remission, be treated as though it was imposed by a Canadian 
Court. 
* * * * * 
R. v. Thieriult 61 c.c.c. (2d) 175 
County Court of Ontario 
The accused lady walked into a bank, placed an empty paper bag in front of 
the teller and said: "Put the money in, this is no joke". The teller said, 
"You are at the wrong wicket", to which the accused responded, "I don't 
care". When charged with robbery she claimed that she had uttered no 
threat of any kind and that therefore her action did not amount to robbery. 
The Judge agreed with the reasoning of 
Victoria, B. c.l, that any demand for 
transactions includes "or else ...... 
a Provincial 
money outside 
Court Judge in 
normal banking 
However, being fully aware that from now on bank robbers may speak friendly 
and will not make any threats to escape a charge of robbery, the Judge said 
to have reasonable doubt whether the tone of the accused's demand included 
a threat. She was, therefore, acquitted of robbery but convicted of the 
lesser and included offence of theft over $200. 
Comment: Perhaps subconsciously, some facetious consideration was given to 
the tone and consequences of demands made by the banks when exercising 
their claims on the goods and chattels of others. Although in a different 
way, some of these must sound far more threatening than the utterances of 
this lady. 
IR. v. Ketrensky (1975) 24 c.c.c. (2d) 350 
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Wilfully Abandoning Child 
R. v. Reedy (No.2) 60 C.C.C. (2d) 104 
District Judge's Criminal Court - Ontario 
The accused, a person apparently problemed with drug abuse, who had been 
"totalled" by glue sniffing and beer drinking the night before, was asked 
to babysit the three children of the couple he lived with. The children 
were 1, 2, and 3 years of age. The parents promised to be back in one hour 
but stayed away five hours. The accused became ill and phoned the place 
where the parents were and threatened to leave the children to go to the 
hospital. When the parents did not return after five hours, he carried out 
his threat. 
The children left the house and one of them was killed by a car on a 
highway. The accused was charged under section 200 C.C., wth wilfully 
abandoning children under the age of 10 years. 
The Court said that "wilful" means deliberate and purposeful conduct with 
recklessness and indifference to consequences of acts or omissions: in this 
case a complete and utter disregard for the safety of the children. 
The Court acquitted the accused commenting that there was a duty on the 
parents who knew the accused's condition of health. They should have 
returned within the promised time. In view of the accused's state of 
health when he left the home, it could not be said that he wilfully left 
the children. 
* * * * * 
Effect of Changing One's Hind After Refusing to Blow 
Sagh v. a. [1981) 6 w.w.a. 370 
Alberta Queen's Bench 
The accused refused to give a sample of his breath as: "I didn 1 t think I 
would have to blow cause I didn't have that much to drink". When he was 
told he would be held overnight the accused changed his mind and said, 
"Okay, I' 11 blow then". According to the accused, the response was: "We 
don't baby sit around here. We don't ask guys twice • • • • • You had 
your chance and blew it". 
The accused was convicted of refusing to give a sample of breath. He 
appealed this conviction. 
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The Justice of the Queen's Bench observed that the evidence revealed that 
the refusal and the subsequent willingness to comply with the officer's 
demand was all part of one continuous conversation accompanied by an 
"uninterrupted flow of events". All this had to be considered in its 
entire context, or else the "true meaning of it is lost". 
Although agreeing with precedents which state that there is no such thing 
as a final refusal and that the offence is complete when the refusal is 
uttered or conveyed, this Justice held that in view of his findings about 
"the flow of events", the refusal and the subsequent willingness to comply 
were all part of this one conversation. There was, therefore, no 
"unequivocal refusal". 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction quashed 
